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ABSTRACT: This paper seeks to evaluate and explain the degree of supranational 
entrepreneurship shown by the European Commission following the global financial 
crisis. Focusing on the period 2007–2011, it finds that the Commission used its right 
of initiative and/or mobilised ideas and information to pursue a supranational 
European Union (EU) economic policy in few cases. These findings are explained 
with reference to strategic entrepreneurship, that is the Commission’s reluctance to 
support integrationist initiatives unless they stand a chance of success, and by the fact 
that partisanship took precedence for the EU executive over the pursuit of integration 
in some cases. The Commission could yet capitalise on the crisis but its actions in this 
period call for greater attention by scholars to preference formation by supranational 
actors as well as a reconsideration of what it means for the EU executive to lead. 
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Introduction 
 
‘Please, Little Blue Engine,’ cried all the dolls and toys. ‘Won’t you pull our train 
over the mountain?’ (Watty Piper) 
 
Whether supranational entrepreneurship can succeed is a recurring question in debates 
about European integration, with Sandholtz and Zysman (1989) and Moravcsik 
(1999) differing over Jacques Delors’ influence, just as Haas (1958) and Hoffmann 
(1964) had done in relation to Jean Monnet. Scholars typically see the European 
Commission as being ‘in decline’ after Delors (Peterson 2012, 97). Both Jacques 
 anter and  omano Prodi  ere criticised for  ea  leadership (Cini 2008),  hile Jose  
Manuel Barroso is seen as a pragmatist rather than a pioneer (Cini 2005). For all such 
declinism, the idea that the Commission can show leadership in general (see 
Sandholtz and Stone Sweet 2012) and in relation to specific areas of policy-making 
(Howarth 2008; Parker and Karlsson 2010) still resonates with some scholars. 
 
Theories of supranational entrepreneurship tend to emphasise structure over agency. 
Pollack (1997) sees the Commission’s capacity for entrepreneurship as contingent on 
member states’ uncertainty about optimal policy choices. Distributional consequences 
also matter for Pollack, who sees member states as turning to the Commission for 
information and ideas on further integration in cases where the costs of common 
policies are low. Commission entrepreneurship also depends, he argues, on the 
support of significant non-governmental actors. For Moravcsik (1999), supranational 
entrepreneurship will succeed if the Commission can solve collective action problems 
before national governments. Failures of organisation and representation will favour 
entrepreneurship, he argues, when the Commission is better informed than 
governments about interest groups that support integrationist initiatives. Failures of 
aggregation will work similarly, Moravcsik argues, when the Commission backs such 
initiatives before governments form a coherent negotiating position. 
There is limited space for agency in these accounts since both assume the 
Commission would engage in entrepreneurship if structural conditions allow. For 
Pollack (2005, 36), the Commission is an engine of integration because its officials 
are hard ired to support ‘more Europe’ for reasons of self-interest or ideology. This 
point is consistent with Moravcsik (1999, 271n) who assumes that the Commission 
‘tend[s] to favor more ambitious schemes for further institutional and substantive 
integration’.  ecent research gives reason to question these assumptions. That the EU 
executive has become more partisan is suggested by Hix (2008), who finds that the 
median-voter in the Barroso Commission is to the right of the median- voters in the 
Santer and Prodi administrations. This is due, he argues, to changes introduced by the 
Nice Treaty, which allowed a qualified majority of (centre-right) governments to 
propose Barroso as President in June 2004 and ended the practice whereby large 
countries nominated Commissioners from both the left and right. What these changes 
mean for supranational entrepreneurship Hix does not say, but his findings surely 
imply that partisanship can take precedence over the pursuit of further integration. 
 
This paper uses the reform of EU economic policy following the 2007– 2008 global 
financial crisis as a case study in supranational entrepreneur- ship. As economic crises 
go, the EU has faced no greater challenge, severe liquidity shortages starting in mid 
2007 followed by a systemic banking crisis in late 2008. These events led to a severe 
recession in the euro area in 2009 followed by surge in government borrowing. By 
early 2010, Greece was close to defaulting, with Ireland and Portugal facing a similar 
fate soon after. Although the crisis had clearly yet to run its course by the end of 
2011, it had already served as a catalyst for policy change, with member states 
agreeing on, inter alia, a coordinated bank rescue, a joint fiscal stimulus package, new 
legislation on financial regulation and economic surveillance and the creation of ad-
hoc and permanent crisis resolution mechanisms. For all this policy activism, this 
paper finds little evidence that the Barroso Commission used its right of initiative or 
mobilised information or ideas to further integration following the global financial 
crisis. This lack of entrepreneurship is e plained  ith reference to both structure and 
agency.  n the case of the former, the Commission acted strategically by steering clear 
of integrationist initiatives that  ere opposed by member states.  s regards the latter, 
Jose  anuel Barroso’s defence of fiscal conservativism and light-touch financial 
regulation over further integration fits with the centre-right orientation of his 
administration. 
 
The remainder of this paper is divided into three sections. The first section considers 
different definitions of supranational entrepreneurship and, on this basis, evaluates the 
degree of entrepreneurship displayed by the Commission during the period 2007–
2011. The second see s to e plain the Commission’s cautious response to the global 
financial crisis with reference to the role of structure and agency. The final section 
considers the wider implications of these findings and considers whether the 
Commission could yet emerge as an entrepreneur in response to the crisis. 
 
Evaluating Commission Entrepreneurship Following the Crisis 
 
Traditional theories of supranational entrepreneurship can be traced in spirit, if not in 
name, to Haas (1964, 153). Here Haas highlighted the Commission’s tendency to 
upgrade the common interest——i.e., seek additional powers for itself at the expense 
of member states——in negotiations over shared policy problems. While Haas (1964) 
sa  the Commission’s right of initiative as the supreme instrument of supranational 
entrepreneur- ship, contemporary scholars tend to focus on informal agenda setting, 
with the latter involving the mobilisation of information and ideas in sup- port of 
further integration rather than specific legislative proposals (Pol- lack 1997; 
Moravcsik 1999). Taking these definitions as its point of departure, this section 
evaluates the e tent to  hich the Commission sought to ‘upgrade the common 
interest’ and/or engage in informal agenda setting in relation to EU economic policy 
from mid 2007 to the end of 2011. Following Musgrave (1959), this investigation 
focuses on the classic functions of economic policy: regulation, stabilisation, 
allocation and redistribution. 
 
Regulation 
 
The Commission’s regulatory response to the financial crisis  as cautious at first.  t 
was not until the banking turmoil took hold in  utumn 2008 that the EU e ecutive 
tabled a revised directive on deposit insurance and a ne  regulation on credit rating 
agencies. The remainder of Jose  anuel Barroso’s first term sa  ne  proposals on 
the regulation of hedge funds and capital requirements and the reform of EU financial 
supervision. Barroso’s second term,  hich began in February 2010, sa  a surge in 
regulatory reforms with the Commission adopting 20 proposals for new or revised 
regulation by the end of 2011, including a further tightening of the rules on deposit 
insurance, credit rating agencies, hedge funds and capital requirements along with 
proposals for new and revised legislation on over-the-counter derivatives, short-
selling, market abuse and accounting standards. 
 
The Commission’s willingness to use its right of initiative in this context chimes with 
Haas (1964), but it is questionable whether such proposals seek to empower the 
Commission at the expense of governments. A case in point is the proposal on the 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), with the Commission seeking a place on the 
ne  body’s General Board but leaving it to the European Central Ban  (ECB) and the 
27 governors of the national central banks of EU member states to choose a chair 
from their ranks. Nor did the Commission seek binding powers for this new body. 
National authorities are under no legal obligation to follow ESRB recommendations 
with non-compliers required only to give reasons for their decision under a so-called 
‘as  and e plain’ mechanism. 
Turning to informal conceptions of entrepreneurship, the Commission was also 
cautious about mobilising information and ideas in favour of financial re-regulation 
during the period in question. Whereas French President Nicolas Sarkozy waited just 
six days after worldwide liquidity shortages came to light in  ugust 2007 before 
publicly calling for greater financial transparency, stronger financial supervision and a 
reevaluation of the role of credit rating agencies (Gauthier- illars 2007), Jose  
Manuel Barroso waited until January 2008 before making substantive public remarks 
about the regulatory implications of the crisis. Even then, Barroso sounded a 
conservative rather than radical note, urging EU leaders to steer clear of ‘futile 
attempts to stem financial globalisation’ at a meeting of EU G8 members in London 
(Commission. 2008a). The Commission President stuck to this line even after the 
turbulent events of  utumn 2008,  arning against ‘grand initiatives that have no 
chance of being follo ed through’ (Barroso 2008). 
 
If the Commission showed any ideational leadership at this time it was in relation to 
EU financial supervision.  ignificant in this respect  as Barroso’s decision in 
November 2008 to invite Jacques de Larosiere to lead a high-level group on EU 
financial supervision.  lthough the group’s recommendations  ere not implemented 
in full——EU finance ministers, for example, diluted attempts to give the new 
supervisory agencies binding powers of dispute resolution in the event of 
disagreement between national authorities——they nonetheless served as a blueprint 
for the legislative package proposed by the Commission in September 2009 and 
adopted by the Council of Ministers and the European Parliament in November 2010. 
 
In spite of this reform and others, financial regulation was by no means championed 
in the Commission’s post-crisis vision. In his 2010 State of the Union address, for 
example, Barroso (2010) acknowledged the necessity of ‘proper regulation and proper 
supervision’  hile insisting on the importance of ‘a strong and sound financial sector 
... that serves the real economy’. ore tangible evidence of the Commission’s 
reticence regarding financial re-regulation can be found in the Single Market Act. 
This pack- age of t elve proposals for ‘ne , greener and more inclusive gro th’ in 
the light of the crisis launched in July 2011 called for common rules on venture-
capital funds but otherwise made no reference to financial market policies 
(Commission 2011a). 
 
Stabilisation 
 
When it came to economic stabilisation, the Commission was willing to propose new 
legislation over the period 2007–2011 in only some instances. The Commission’s 
most decisive step in this regard was the so- called ‘si -pac ’, a set of si  legislative 
proposals presented in September 2010 with a view to reinforcing E U’s fiscal rules 
and widening the scope of economic surveillance. Also important in this regard was 
the so-called ‘t o-pac ’, a set of proposals put for ard in November 2011 calling for 
closer scrutiny of member states’ draft budgets and more intrusive surveillance for 
euro area members facing financial instability. Significant though such proposals 
were, it is debatable whether they upgrade the Commission’s po er over economic 
stabilisation to any significant degree. The ‘t o-pac ’, for e ample, called for the 
Commission to be given the power to issue ex-ante opinions on member states’ future 
budgetary plans, while leaving the final say over such plans in the hands of national 
governments and parliaments. 
 
Of the many ideas inspired by the euro area’s sovereign debt difficulties, Eurobonds 
are perhaps the most integrationist, involving as they would the joint issuance and/or 
guarantee of national government debt. The Commission, for its part, was a late 
convert to this particular cause and even then a some hat reluctant one. hen as ed 
about Eurobonds in an appearance before the European Parliament in December 
2009, Jose  anuel Barroso said only that such an idea  as not being proposed at the 
present juncture (European Parliament 2009). Commissioner for Economic and 
Monetary Affairs Olli Rehn took a small step further in December 2010, describing 
Eurobonds as ‘intellectually attractive’. By  eptember 2011, the Commission’s 
thinking on this issue had shifted but not radically so,  ith Jose  Manuel Barroso 
telling EPs that the Commission  ould present ‘options for the introduction of 
Eurobonds’ (Barroso 2011). The Commission seemed in no hurry to put for ard 
legislative proposals here, waiting a further two months before launching a Green 
Paper on Eurobonds (Commission 2011d). 
 
When it came to informal agenda setting, the Commission can legitimately claim to 
have mobilised ideas and information in support of the proposed macroeconomic 
imbalance procedure. A widely cited Commission study published in November 2006 
 arned that ‘mar ed and protracted divergences in gro th and inflation among euro-
area members, accompanied by sizeable shifts in real effective exchange rates and 
current account imbalances’ (Commission 2006: 12). The Commission returned to 
this theme in a high-profile report on the first decade of the euro, which emphasised 
the need ‘to broaden surveillance to address macroeconomic imbalances’ 
(Commission 2008b, 8). 
Ideational leadership with respect to the fiscal consequences of the crisis is more 
difficult to discern. The Commission’s initial response to the turbulent events of mid 
2007  as to defend the status quo rather than see  a supranational approach to 
stabilisation.  n February 2008, Jose  anuel Barroso called not as  nternational 
Monetary Fund (IMF) Managing Director Dominique Strauss Kahn had done a month 
earlier for ‘a ne  fiscal policy’ (Giles and Tett 2008) but for fiscal discipline and 
compliance with the stability and growth pact (Barber 2008). By December 2008, the 
Commission had come round to the idea of a modest fiscal stimulus pack- age, putting 
for ard a European Economic  ecovery Programme that called on ‘ ember states 
and the EU to agree to an immediate budgetary impulse amounting to e200 billion 
(1.5 per cent of GDP; European Com- mission 2008c). By April 2010, Rehn (2010) 
was calling not only for compliance with the stability and growth pact but also a 
tightening of E U’s fiscal rules. The Commission  as hardly ahead of the curve in 
doing so, EU heads of state and government having agreed in March to convene a 
tas force led by European Council President Hermann  an  ompuy to e plore ‘all 
options to reinforce the legal frame or ’ concerning crisis resolution and budgetary 
discipline (European Council 2010a). 
 
Allocation 
Moving from stabilisation to allocation finds the Commission more circumspect still 
about the need for further integration following the global financial crisis. In 
presenting its first round of proposals on the Multi-Annual Financial Framework for 
2014–2020, the EU executive showed little appetite for budget maximisation, evoking 
the need for ‘smart sustainable and inclusive’ gro th in the  a e of the crisis but 
calling for a 6.5 per cent cut in total payment appropriations over this period 
(Commission 2011b, 1). This show of austerity, it is true, was balanced by the 
Commission’s plans to devote more resources to public goods such as cohesion, 
although the inclusion of an additional e50 billion in funding for transport and energy 
infrastructure under this heading masked a e10 billion reduction in the amount 
allocated to the EU’s structural funds (House of Lords 2011).  uch cuts, it is true, 
were accompanied by a proposed e18 billion increase in off-budget expenditure on 
allocative instruments such as the Solidarity Fund and the Globalisation Adjustment 
Fund but this increase amounted to only around 2 per cent of total commitments over 
this period (House of Lords 2011). These increases can also be viewed as a 
concession to the European Parliament, which emerged as the ‘supranational 
entrepreneur’ par e cellence here, calling for a 5 per cent increase in EU e penditure 
compared to 2007 levels and insisting that ‘the solution to the crisis [ as] more and 
not less Europe’ (European Parliament 2011). 
 
The EU executive was less entrepreneurial still when it came to the creation of ad-hoc 
instruments of allocation to provide emergency loans to euro area members in the 
context of the financial crisis. By the beginning of 2010 it was clear that Greece was 
in need of external assistance to avoid a disorderly default on its government debt but 
the Commission remained reluctant to be drawn on what role the EU should play in 
pro- viding such support. Speaking at the European Parliament in February 2010, the 
outgoing Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs, Joaquın  lmunia, 
hinted only that treaty instruments were available for this purpose but refused to be 
drawn on what such instruments were (European Parliament 2010b). In the end, the 
treaty was not invoked for Greece, with member states finally agreeing in May 2010 
to pledge EUR 80 billion in bilateral loans. 
 
The Commission played a more prominent but by no means proactive role in efforts 
to create an ad-hoc financial firewall for euro area members, putting forward a 
proposal in May 2010 on the creation of a new e60 billion European Financial 
Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM). In so doing, the EU sought emergency powers 
under Article 122 TFEU to propose the provision of loans and guarantees to a euro 
area member, to borrow funds for this purpose and to disburse this funding to the 
country in question subject to a rigorous review of its economic policy. EU finance 
ministers signed off on this proposal but they kept the Commission at arms length 
from a new EUR 440 billion fund created at the same time. Whereas the EU executive 
was given responsibility for raising funds for the EFSM, the larger fund was entrusted 
to a newly-created European Financial Stability Facility (ESFS), a public-limited 
company registered in Luxembourg and overseen by representatives of the member 
states. 
 
The EFSM and EFSF were envisaged as ad-hoc financial instruments, with EU 
finance ministers agreeing in ay 2010 to ta e for ard plans for ‘establishing a 
permanent crisis resolution framewor ’ (Council 2010).   communication adopted by 
the Commission (2010a) shortly after ards promised ‘in the medium-to-long term to 
make a proposal for a permanent crisis resolution mechanism’ but no such proposals 
were forthcoming by the time the European Council agreed in December 2010 to 
revise Article 136 TFEU with a view to the creation of a new, intergovernmental 
European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The resulting agreement saw member states 
claw back the new allocative competences ceded to the Commission in May 2010, 
with the heads of state and government agreeing that the EFSM would be wound 
do n and that  rticle 122 TFEU  ould henceforth no longer be used ‘to safeguard 
the financial stability of the euro area as a  hole’ (European Council 2010b). 
 
Redistribution 
 
Of all the legislative proposals launched by the Commission in response to the global 
financial crisis during the period 2007–2011, the financial transactions tax is the most 
clear-cut attempt to upgrade the common interest. Under a proposal presented in 
September 2011, financial transactions involving at least one institution located in the 
EU would be subject to a levy of 0.1 per cent on the exchange of shares and bonds 
and 0.01 per cent on the exchange of derivatives (Commission 2011c). Revenues 
raised from these levies, estimated to be in the region of EUR 57 billion would be 
divided between member states and the EU, with the latter contribution becoming a 
ne  ‘o n resource’ for the Community offset by a reduction in national 
contributions. 
 
The idea that the Commission sho ed ideational leadership over the EU financial 
transaction ta  is more difficult to defend.  lthough Jose  anuel Barroso  as an 
early supporter of plans for an international financial transactions tax, his position in 
September 2009 was that such a scheme would be workable only in the context of a 
global agreement that did not harm European competitiveness.
1
 It was not until April 
2010 that the Commission presented a preliminary set of ideas for a financial 
transactions tax at EU level (Commission 2010b). The European Parliament was, 
once again, more entrepreneurial on this issue, adopting a resolution on financial 
transactions taxes in March 2010, which called on the Commission to consider the 
pros and cons of such an arrangement at the EU level (European Parliament 2010a). 
 
Explaining Commission Entrepreneurship Following the Crisis 
 
In summary, then, the preceding section found limited evidence of Com- mission 
entrepreneurship following the global financial crisis during the period 2007–2011. 
The EU executive, it is true, showed itself willing to initiate new legislation on 
financial regulation, economic surveillance and ad-hoc crisis resolution and to 
propose a new financial transactions tax but only the last of these measures can be 
understood as a clear-cut attempt to upgrade the common interest. The Commission 
was, more- over, reluctant to play its hand on some reforms, with legislative proposals 
on a permanent crisis resolution mechanism and Eurobonds not materialising during 
the period in question. The Commission was shown to be less proactive still when it 
came to mobilising ideas and information in support of further integration,  ith only 
Jose  anuel Barroso’s timely decision to convene a high-level group on financial 
supervision and the EU e ecutive’s longstanding calls to step up the surveillance of 
macroeconomic imbalances coming close to informal agenda setting. On wider issues 
of financial regulation and in debates on the need for a coordinated fiscal stimulus 
package and an enlarged EU budget, in contrast, the Commission’s preferences 
prioritised the status quo over the pursuit of further integration. This section seeks to 
explain this lack of supranational entrepreneurship beginning with structural factors 
before loo ing to the role of agency in the Barroso administration’s response to the 
global financial crisis. 
 
From a structural perspective, the conditions for supranational entrepreneurship were 
far from favourable following the global financial crisis. Of the conditions that 
Pollack (1997) sees as critical for Commission influence, only the support of 
significant non-governmental actors for further integration comes close to being 
fulfilled between 2007 and 2011. Financial markets emerged as key cheerleaders for 
further integration during this period,  ith the positive reaction to Barroso’s remar s 
on Euro- bonds in November 2011 one of many such short-lived occurrences.
2 
National governments, in contrast, were far from being uncertain about how to tackle 
the crisis, with German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schauble’s (2010) controversial 
but clear-sighted plans for a European Monetary Fund in March 2010 a case in point. 
Nor were member states in any great rush to tackle the crisis, with the long months of 
negotiation before EU leaders signed off in May 2010 on a financial rescue package 
for Greece far from being an isolated case. That the distributional consequences of 
decision-making in this domain were significant also made supranational 
entrepreneurship more difficult, according to Pollac ’s approach. Of significance here 
 ere member states’ differing degrees of e posure to Gree  debt.  s of the end of 
2011, claims by French banks on Greek debt were estimated at USD 39 billion, as 
compared with figures of USD 33 billion and USD 2 billion for German and Italian 
banks respectively (Bank for International Settlements 2012). 
 
  similar conclusion emerges in relation to oravcsi ’s (1999) theory of 
supranational entrepreneurship. The emergence of a seemingly broad coalition of 
support for an international financial transactions tax is the clearest candidate for the 
empowerment of a latent or peripheral interest group following the financial crisis. 
According to polls conducted on behalf of the European Parliament, support for such 
a tax rose from 47 per cent in 2009 to 64 percent in 2010 (Public Opinion Monitoring 
Unit 2009, 2011). Pressure groups were quick to mobilise around this issue, as 
evidenced by the launch in March 2010 of the Robin Hood Tax Coalition, a UK based 
network of over 100 charities, religious organisations and civil society groups.
3
 
National governments moved quicker still, with UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown 
proposing an international financial transactions tax at a meeting of G20 finance 
ministers in St Andrews in November 2009. If aggregation failures were at work here 
they did not favour the Commission, which waited until April 2010 to present 
preliminary policy proposals on an EU financial transactions tax (Commission 
2010b). 
Although structural factors can account for the difficulties of successful supranational 
entrepreneurship follo ing the crisis can they e plain the Commission’s reluctance to 
push for further integration in the first place? oravcsi ’s account of supranational 
entrepreneurship, it should be recalled, is littered with examples of the Commission 
trying but failing to influence negotiations but he identifies no case in which the 
Commission fails to try. One explanation of this puzzle is to see the Commission as a 
strategic entrepreneur that supports integrationist initiatives only where they stand a 
chance of success. Strategy of this sort could have a number of motivations, including 
the Commission’s need to preserve scarce bureaucratic resources and protect political 
credibility. Career advancement may also play a role here at the level of individuals, 
with members of the Commission requiring the support of national governments to 
secure reappointment. 
 
Consistent with this idea of strategic entrepreneurship is the Commission’s reticence 
over Eurobonds. Faced with a divergence of views between Nicolas Sarkozy and 
Angela Merkel on this issue (Hollinger et al. 2011) a Green Paper was arguably as far 
as the Commission could go without alienating one or other of the Franco–German 
couple.   similar story can be told about the EU financial transactions ta , ith the 
Commission’s  eptember 2011 proposals coming after Jose  anuel Barroso had 
secured a second term and at a time when Franco–German support for such a proposal 
was only beginning to emerge.
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 Strategic entrepreneurship may also explain the 
Commission’s  illingness to put for ard proposals on relatively uncontroversial 
issues such as soft law approaches to macro- economic imbalances and financial 
supervision while steering clear of hard-sell issues such as a supranational permanent 
crisis resolution mechanism. As regards the latter, the Commission can have been in 
little doubt about the inevitability of an intergovernmental ESM given the limits 
imposed on the EFSM by member states. More problematic from this point of view is 
why the Commission did not chime in on those issues where political support for 
further integration  as possible. Cases in point are Barroso’s reluctance to support 
 ar ozy’s calls for financial regulation, the Commission President’s defence of fiscal 
discipline at a time of growing international support for a fiscal stimulus and the EU 
e ecutive’s reluctance to bac  calls by the European Parliament for a bigger budget. 
 Agency 
 
From an agency perspective, these anomalies might be seen as the product of partisan 
preferences rather than strategy borne of structural constraints on supranational 
entrepreneurship. The Commission’s fiscal conservatism during the early phase of the 
crisis provides one instance in which such agency was plausibly at play. Whereas the 
centrist Prodi Commission’s support for the stability and gro th pact  as patchy——
Prodi himself called for a flexible interpretation of the agreement in October 2002 
(Howarth 2008)——the centre-right Barroso Commission made a concerted effort to 
restore compliance  ith E U’s fiscal rules after the controversial reforms of arch 
2005. In so doing, the Barroso Commission confounded expectations that it would 
turn a blind eye to excessive budget deficits, instead recommending corrective action 
against all member states (known to be) in breach of the pact. By mid 2008, this 
strategy appeared to have paid off with all euro area members adjudged to have 
budget deficits below 3 per cent of GDP for the first time since Prodi’s disparaging 
remar s about the pact.  een in these terms, it is hardly surprising that Jose  anuel 
Barroso’s initial response  as to defend the stability and gro th pact rather than 
embrace a coordinated fiscal stimulus package, even if the latter had the potential to 
pave the way for the kind of ex-ante approach to EU fiscal policy coordination that 
economists of the centre- left had long sought (see Collignon 2003). 
 
  similar argument can be made in relation to the Commission’s planned cuts to EU 
expenditure over the period 2014–2020. Barroso had form here, having pushed 
through swinging expenditure cuts during a sharp economic slowdown during his 
time as centre-right Prime Minister of Portugal. Problematic from this perspective is 
why a Commission with centre-right preferences would also favour a new tax on 
financial transactions, although the Commission’s  eptember 2011 proposal, it should 
be recalled, proposed to offset the revenue raised from this tax with a reduction in 
national contributions to the EU budget (Commission 2011c). 
 
That Jose  anuel Barroso  as reluctant to champion the re-regulation of financial 
markets following the financial crisis is also consistent with the centre-right 
preferences of his administration. More puzzling here is how these preferences can be 
reconciled  ith the Commission’s regulatory activism in this domain, especially in 
Barroso’s second term. One explanation of this puzzle is that such activism had more 
to do with the preferences of the Commissioner for the Internal Market and Services 
than the Commission President, with the decision to give this portfolio to Michel 
Barnier in February 2010 paving the way for a more pro-regulation approach. 
Precisely how pro-regulation Barnier is is unclear but he is most certainly to the left 
of his predecessor, Charlie McCreevy, who came to the defence of hedge funds in the 
early days of the financial crisis and showed little sign of changing his views as the 
crisis worsened (McCreevy 2007; McCreevy 2009). 
 
For his part, Jose  anuel Barroso has appeared less then comfortable  ith Barnier’s 
appointment, with the Commission President threatening in November 2011 to 
decouple the internal market and financial services portfolio to assuage UK concerns 
over undue French influence in this domain (Taylor and Rankin 2009). A similar offer 
is said to have emerged after the European Council in December 2011, with Barroso 
offering to ‘promote’ Barnier to the post of High  epresentative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy in return for UK support for the Fiscal Compact 
(Barker and Parker 2012). Neither threat was carried out, how- ever, leaving Barnier 
to put forward legislative proposals for financial market reforms at a rate of just under 
one per month between February 2010 and December 2011 as compared to a rate of 
just over one ever four months under Charlie McCreevy between August 2007 and 
February 2010. 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, this paper has sought to evaluate and explain the degree of 
supranational entrepreneurship shown by the Commission following the global 
financial crisis. Focusing on the period between the beginning of the crisis in 2007 
and the end of 2011, it found little evidence that the EU executive sought to increase 
its power at the expense of member states either by using its right of initiative or 
mobilising information and ideas in support of further integration. Structural factors 
partly explain this lack of entrepreneurship insofar as the Commission was reluctant 
to endorse integrationist initiatives that stood little immediate chance of success. The 
EU e ecutive’s reluctance to play its hand over Eurobonds and a more supra- national 
ESM are illustrative in this regard. Strategic entrepreneurship of this sort cannot, 
however, explain the Commission’s defence of the status quo against calls for a 
coordinated fiscal stimulus package, financial regulation and a bigger EU budget. 
This conservatism, it was argued, is consistent  ith the Barroso Commission’s centre-
right preferences, with fiscal discipline and light-touch financial regulation taking 
precedence over the pursuit of further integration. 
 
The global financial crisis has yet to run its course at the time of writing and there is 
nothing to say that the Commission might not yet emerge as a supranational 
entrepreneur if structural conditions allo  and/or political priorities are reordered. 
 ndeed, the intensification of the euro area sovereign debt crisis in mid 2012 suggests 
that such a shift might already be under ay,  ith Jose  anuel Barroso (2012) 
talking openly about the possibility of fiscal union and euro area leaders agreeing to 
take forward plans for a banking union (Euro Area Heads of State and Government 
2012). Precisely where such ideas will lead is not yet known but the fact remains that 
the Commission’s response to the crisis bet een 2007–2011 was much less 
integration-minded than might have been expected. 
 
For students of the Commission, the analysis presented in this paper calls for a 
reconsideration of what it means for the EU executive to lead. For too long, scholars 
have decried the Commission as being in decline because of the failure of successive 
presidents to emulate the (perceived) success of Monnet or Delors in driving forward 
the integration process. It would be wrong to do so in relation to Jose  Manuel 
Barroso, whose reluctance to embrace integrationist initiatives after the global 
financial crisis owed as much to political choices as political constraints. Whether 
these choices were right for the ailing EU economy is a discussion for another day but 
the fact that a leader of the EU executive had objectives other than the steady 
accumulation of powers at the supranational level is a mark surely of political 
maturity rather than powerlessness. 
For students of supranational entrepreneurship, finally, this paper’s findings call for 
further reflection on how supranational actors form their preferences. Great progress 
has been made over the last two decades in understanding how national governments 
come to a view on the desirability or otherwise of closer cooperation with EU 
partners. Yet scholars routinely treat the preferences of the Commission and other 
supranational actors as a black box. Recent research suggests that the Commission 
may not be alone among EU institutions in having policy priorities other than the 
pursuit of ever-closer union (see Hodson 2011, chapter 2; Brack and Costa 2012), 
with the implication being that the traditional engines of European integration run on 
different fuel these days than was once thought to be the case. 
 
Notes 
1. ‘EU divided on German “Tobin” ta  proposal’,  gence France Presse, 17 
September 2009. 
2. ‘European shares bounce bac  on euro bonds hopes’,  euters, 14  eptember 2011. 
3. http://robinhoodtax.org/. 
4. ‘Germany says transaction tax would be EU- ide’,  euters, 17  ugust 2011.  
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